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Constitutional Challenges to Section 812
of the Fair Housing Act
INTRODUCTION
In 1988 Congress passed a number of dramatic amendments to
the Fair Housing Act.' One of the more controversial new provisions
found m section 8122 allows the use of administrative law judges to
adjudicate disputes between persons claiming to have experienced
discrimination and those accused of discriminatory housing prac-
tices. Congress's attempt to commit such determinations to an ad-
ministrative tribunal raises serious issues under both the seventh
amendment and article III of the United States Constitution.
Since the Supreme Court's decision m Curtis v Loether,3 dam-
ages actions under the Fair Housing Act have been interpreted as
actions to enforce legal rights within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment.4 In such a cause of action, either party may demand
a jury trial, something not permitted m the adjudication scheme of
the newly amended section 812.
Similarly, Congress has been limited in the causes of action it
may assign to a non-article III forum by the Court's decision in
Atlas Roofing Co. v Occupational Safety Comm'n.5 "[Congress]
. lacks the power to strip parties contesting matters of private
right of their constitutional right to a trial by jury" simply by
assigning these matters to an administrative tribunal.6
Despite these potential constitutional challenges to the admims-
trative adjudication scheme of section 812, the Court has upheld
similar legislation where the parties freely waived their protections
I Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619-1636
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.).
2 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (West 1988).
415 U.S. 189 (1974).
4 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
6 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, -U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2795 (1989).
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under the seventh amendment and article III. 7 Tius exception may
prove to be the constitutional salvation for the amended section 812.
Tis note focuses on the perceived constitutional infirmities of
section 812 by first examining its statutory structure, and then
determining whether the statute would survive scrutiny under seventh
amendment and article III challenges. Finally, consideration is given
to whether or not the administrative adjudication scheme of section
812 is permissible under a theory of waiver.
I. OPERATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 19888 creates three related
enforcement provisions. The first provision permits the federal gov-
ernment to take direct action in implementing the goals of the Fair
Housing Act. Under section 814, the United States Attorney General
may sue in federal district court when there is reasonable cause to
believe that "any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern
or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights
granted" by the amended act.9 Additionally, the Attorney General
has the discretion to start a civil action if the Secretary for Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), acting under section 810(g),' 0 makes
a "reasonable cause determination" of a discriminatory practice
based on a complaint from an aggrieved private person." Under
section 810(c), the Attorney General also may act when there is a
breach of a conciliation agreement between private parties.'2 Gen-
erally, the Attorney General may ask for injunctive relief and civil
damages. 3 However, any person may "upon timely application"
intervene in the action commenced by the Attorney General14 and
receive monetary damages. 5 Thus this provision, which appears
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (Com-
modity Exchange Act); Thomas v. Umon Carbide Aguc. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985)
(Federal Insecticide Fungicide & Rodenticide Act).
'Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619-36
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.).
42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (West 1988).
.42 U.S.C. § 3610(g).
" 42 U.S.C. § 3614(b).
12 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c).
" 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(A)-(C). Civil damages are not to exceed $50,000 for a first
offense or $100,000 for any further violations.
" 42 U.S.C. § 3614(e).
" 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(B).
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simply to provide for civil actions between the federal government
and individuals who violate the Fair Housing Act, also lends support
to aggrieved individuals. Section 810(c) can be triggered by com-
plaints from private persons seeking to press their rights under the
Act; even if the Attorney General begins an action sua sponte,
private persons can join m the action and receive remedial damages.
Tis administrative scheme creates the possibility that private liability
between individuals will be adjudged as much as vindicating the
federal government's interest m enforcing the Act.
The second enforcement provision was also found in the original
Fair Housing Act.16 Under section 813, private persons who believe
they have been subjected to a discriminatory housing practice may,
within two years of the occurrence of the discrimination or the
termination of the practice, start a civil action m federal district
court17 A civil action also may be started upon the breach of a
conciliation agreement.' 8 This section provides for the appointment
of an attorney and the waiver of court costs and fees if the aggrieved
party cannot "bear the costs of such [civil] action." 19 A rmrror
provision to section 814 allows the United States Attorney General
to intervene in any civil action upon "certification that the case is
of general public unportance." ° Private plaintiffs who prevail in
these actions may receive injunctive relief, actual and punitive dam-
ages, 21 plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs at the discretion of
the trial judge.22 Notably, no other enforcement provision allows
for punitive damages. Additionally, under the 1968 Act there was a
$1000 limit for punitive damages.? The 1988 amendments removed
that limit.u Consequently, defendants in civil actions under section
813 are now subject to a much higher degree of liability should their
actions be found sufficiently egregious by a judge or jury.
Interestingly, aggrieved persons cannot commence a civil action
under section 813 if they have advanced their claims under the third
and final enforcement provision, to the extent that an adnmstrative
"6 See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284 § 812, 82 Stat. 88 (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1988)).
17 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a).
is Id.
19 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b).
42 U.S.C. § 3613(e). Upon intervention the Attorney General is accorded the same
sort of relief available under section 814(e); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
21 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1).
- 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2).
2 See Civil Rights.Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284 § 812, 82 Stat. 88.
- See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1).
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law judge "has commenced a hearing on the record" concerning a
charge of an alleged discriminatory practice.5 This suggests that
rights provided under the civil remedy of section 813 are closely
analogous to the disputed rights before an administrative law judge
under section 812. It is this identity of rights between the civil action
provided m section 813 and the administrative adjudication provided
under section 812 that is at the heart of the constitutional contro-
versy over section 812.
Under the third enforcement provision, disputes may be tried by
an admimstrative law judge.26 This procedure is complex. First, an
aggrieved person files a complaint with HUD under section 810.27
A complaint may be referred to a "substantially equivalent" state
agency,2s but when no referral is made, HUD must complete mves-
tigation of the complaint within 100 days.29 During this period HUD
may attempt to mediate a conciliation agreement between the com-
plainant and respondent. 0 Such conciliation agreements are subject
to the HUD Secretary's approval31 and may involve the use of
binding arbitration.3 2 If no conciliation agreement is reached, the
HUD Secretary must, within the 100 day period after the filing of
the complaint, determine "based on the facts whether reasonable
cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has
occurred or is about to occur. ' ' 33 If reasonable cause exists, the
Secretary must "issue a charge on behalf of the aggrieved person,
for further proceedings under section 812." 4 After the HUD Sec-
retary files a charge, under section 810 "a complainant, a respon-
dent, or an aggrieved person on whose behalf the complaint was
filed, may elect to have the claims asserted in that charge decided
- 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(3).
- 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b).
- 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(l)(A)(i). Aggrieved parties have one year to file after the
occurrence or termination of the alleged discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 3610(f). The Secretary of HUD must certify that such state or local
agencies are "substantially equivalent" by looking to the substantive rights protected by
such agencies as well as their procedures, remedies available, and even the existence of
judicial review.
42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv).
42 U.S.C. § 3610(b)(1).
3 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b)(2).
32 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b)(3).
33 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(1).
-4 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(A). There is an exception provided under 42 U.S.C. §
3610(g)(2)(C) that requires the HUD Secretary to refer matters involving the legality of state
and local zoning or land use law to the Attorney General under § 814, instead of issuing a
charge triggering § 812.
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in a civil action. ' 35 The party making this election has twenty days
after receipt of process to request a trial.3 6 Although either party
involved in this proceeding still may exercise the right to a jury trial
in an article III court, section 812 gives the aggrieved party several
important advantages over the respondent. Should a respondent elect
a civil action, the Attorney General must enter the civil action on
"behalf of the aggrieved person." 37 If the adrmnistrative law judge
has not begun a hearing on the record, the aggrieved party can halt
the admnimstrative proceeding unilaterally by filing a civil action
under state civil rights statutes, section 813, or any other Act of
Congress pertaining to "discriminatory housing practice, ' 38 such as
section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act.3 9
If the parties to the dispute decide to use the administrative
tribunal, they are accorded the right to "appear in person, be
represented by counsel, present evidence, cross-examine witnesses,
and obtain the issuance of subpoenas."' 4 There are provisions for
expedited discovery and procedure. 41 In short, the action closely
resembles a court trial, despite the absence of a jury or an article
III judge. The administrative law judge can assess civil penalties
against a respondent who "has engaged or is about to engage in
discriminatory housing practice," and the judge may issue injunctive
or other equitable relief for the aggrieved party, including the award
of actual damages. 4
Review of the administrative law judge's action is two-fold. Final
orders are reviewed by the Secretary for Housing and Urban De-
velopment,43 and also may be subject to review by a federal circuit
court.44
35 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a).
3 Id.
- 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o).
3, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(0 provides as follows:
An adnumstrative law judge may not continue administrative proceedings
under this section regarding any alleged discriminatory housing practice after
the beginning of the trial of a civil action commenced by the aggrieved party
under any Act of Congress or a State law, seelang relief with respect to that
discriminatory housing practice.
39 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides as follows:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, m every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c).
" 42 U.S.C. § 3612(d).
12 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g).
-3 42 U.S.C. § 3612(h).
" 42 U.S.C. § 3612(i). Any party aggrieved by a final order for relief may seek review
1990-91]
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Having set out the mechanics of the enforcement procedures,
this note now focuses on the constitutionality of section 812.
II. PossIBLE CONSTITUIONAL CHALLENGES TO SECTION 812
The administrative adjudication provision of section 812 would
most likely be attacked on seventh amendment and article III grounds.
Defendants, denied a jury trial m the administrative hearing, would
claim they had been stripped of their seventh amendment right to a
trial by jury If the defendants were indeed entitled to a jury trial,
they would contend that it would have to be before an article III
court,45 as the "judicial power" of the United States clearly rests
with article III courts.4 However, m some instances Congress may
assign resolution of a claim that appears to be subject to seventh
amendment protections to non-article III adjudicative bodies, which
do not use juries as fact finders.
The jurisprudence of seventh amendment and article III consti-
tutional challenges remains a complex and confusing assembly of
decisions. The relatively recent proliferation of administrative law
judges and other non-article III tribunals has forced the United
States Supreme Court to refine its reasoning. This paper utilizes the
analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg47 to determine whether section 812 is constitutional:
- 42 U.S.C. § 3612(i). Any party aggrieved by a final order for relief may seek review
under 28 U.S.C. ch. 158, notably 28 U.S.C. § 2342, which provides in part,
The court of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) has the exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, and suspend
(in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of-
(6) all final orders under section 812 of the Fair Housing Act.
41 An article III court is one in which an article III judge presides. See, e.g., Northern
Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982). The attributes of
article III judges are clearly set forth in the United States Constitution article III, § 1:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behavior, and Shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance m
Office.
Essentially, article II judges enjoy life tenure, subject to impeachment, and they are paid
a fixed and irreducible compensation for their judicial services. In Northern Pipeline the
-Court felt that these attributes assured that article III judges would remain neutral and
independent-unaffected by political passions present in the other branches of the federal
system.
"U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides in part,
The Judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.
- U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2790 (1989). Granfinanciera provides an excellent
[VOL. 79
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The form of our analysis is familiar. "First, we compare the
statutory action to the 18th-century actions brought m the courts
of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.
Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it
is legal or equitable m nature." Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412, 417-418 (1987). The second stage of this analysis is more
important than the first. Id. at 421. If, on balance, these two
factors indicate that a party is entitled to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment, we must decide whether Congress may assign
and has assigned resolution of the relevant claim to a non-Article
III adjudicative body that does not use a jury as a factfmder.4
III. SEVENTH AMENDmENT CHALLENGES TO SECTION 812
A. Rights Historically Analogous to Section 812
The seventh amendment provides as follows:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-exanuned in any
paradigm for resolving the seventh amendment and article III constitutional challenges
presented by § 812. In Granfinanctera, a chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee brought an action
against Colombian defendants to void allegedly fraudulent transfers. The bankruptcy court
demed motions by the defendants for a jury trial. Congress had assigned the bankruptcy
courts jurisdiction to hear fraudulent transfer claims as part of a bankruptcy's "core
proceedings." Despite this, the Supreme Court found that the bankruptcy court did not
have jurisdiction over fraudulent transfers unless the defendants consented to jurisdiction.
However, no such direct consent was ever given by the defendants. They were forced to
appear before the bankruptcy court solely because of the trustee's actions. Even without
explicit consent, the defendants would have come within the bankruptcy court's authority
had they submitted a claim against the bankruptcy estate. Since no such claim was submitted
by the defendants, they preserved their seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Absent any
consent to jurisdiction by the defendants, Justice Brennan succeeded in analogizing actions
to recover fraudulent transfers by a bankruptcy trustee to a cause at common-law in the
late 18th century English courts. Furthermore, the Court could find no "public rights"
cause of action created by Congress that might permit assignment of the action to a non-
article III court.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the Granfinanciera seventh amendment analysis
in Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, -U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 1339, 58 U.S.L.W 4345,
4346 (1990). Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall found an action for a breach of a
umon's duty of fair representation to involve both equitable and legal claims. Since the
historical prong of the analysis gave no clear indication of whether the claim implicated the
seventh amendment jury trial right, Marshall relied solely on the second prong of the
analysis, finding the monetary damages sought to be a strong indication that the type of
relief sought was that normally accorded in courts of law. Thus the seventh amendment
entitled the respondent union members to a jury trial.
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, - U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2790 (1989).
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Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law 49
The Supreme Court consistently has interpreted the phrase
"Suits at common law" to mean, "suits in which legal rights were
to be ascertained and deternuned, in contradistinction to those
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable reme-
dies were administered. ",5o While it should be readily apparent
that "the thrust of the Amendment was to preserve the right to
jury trial as it existed in 1791, the right extends beyond the
common-law forms of actions recognized at that time." 5 Indeed,
the Court has held that the seventh amendment applies to a host
of causes based on statutes that did not exist in 1791 .52 "The
Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory
rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates
legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in
the ordinary courts of law." '53
Fortunately, there is no need to engage in the sometimes arcane
analysis of whether the rights created under section 812 are pro-
tected by the seventh amendment. The Supreme Court resolved
this issue in Curtis v. Loether.54 The plaintiff in Curtis claimed
that the white defendants refused to rent her an apartment because
she was black. She sued the defendants under the old section 812
of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, which is comparable to section 813
of the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act. Both of those sections
provide for civil actions to redress violations of fair housing laws.
The Supreme Court had little difficulty in determining the nature
of the right involved in such a civil action. "We think it is clear
that a damages action under § 812 is an action to enforce 'legal
rights' within the meaning of our Seventh Amendment decisions." 5
In reaching this conclusion, the Court appears to have used the
same analysis it would later make explicit in Tull v United States.5 6
Tull involved a demand for jury trial, asserted by a defendant who
49 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
,I Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
52 See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962) (trademark laws);
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (immigration laws); cf. Flietmann v.
Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) (antitrust laws).
51 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194.
S4 Id. at 189.
S Id. at 195.
s481 U.S. 412 (1987).
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violated the Clean Water Act57 by dumping fill material into nav-
igable waters, without a permit. The United States sued for civil
damages. Both the district court and court of appeals denied a
jury trial for the civil penalty The Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts after determining that a jury trial was required. 8
The test in Tull operates by first finding a cause of action in
a suit at common law comparable to the congressionally created
statute, then second, examining the actual remedy provided by the
statute to determine whether it is of a legal or equitable nature.59
The majority in Curtis found the cause of action created by statute
in a housing discrimination suit similar to a tort:
A damages action under the statute sounds basically m tort-the
statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts
to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's
wrongful breach. [Tihis cause of action is analogous to a
number of tort actions recognized at common law. More impor-
tant, the relief sought here-actual and punitive damages-is the
traditional form of relief offered m the courts of law 60
Thus, the statutory right to be adjudicated in the amended
section 812 is directly analogous to an eighteenth century "suit at
common law " The substantive cause of action brought under
section 812 has not changed since the opimon in Curtis. The only
change has been the new availability of an administrative forum
under section 812 for a right that otherwise could be enforced
through the civil action available under section 813. Now parties
have an additional choice. They can agree to submit to an admin-
istrative law judge's determination or go to district court. The legal
remedies sought in the current civil action remain the same as those
under the 1968 Act-"actual and punitive" damages. The remedies
- 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (West 1988).
m Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987).
19 Id. at 417-18. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, describes the process this
way:
To determine whether a statutory action is more similar to cases that were
tried in courts of law than to suits tried m courts of equity or admiralty, the
Court must examine both the nature of the action and of the remedy sought.
First, we compare the statutory action to the 18th-century actions brought in
the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.
See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 378 (1974); Dairy Queen
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962). Second, we examine the remedy sought
and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature. See, e.g., Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1970).
- Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-196.
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in the administrative forum are also essentially legal in nature; they
mirror the rights of the civil action with the exception that only
punitive damages are unavailable to aggrieved parties. In charac-
terizing the nature of the relief under the admimstrative provision
of section 812, one might echo the language of Curtis: "if a
plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and actual damages, he is
entitled to a judgment in that amount." 6' The character of the
award under section 812 is compensatory, as is the nature of the
award under section 813. The right under section 812 is similar to
a tort action, which strongly indicates that it should come within
the protections of the seventh amendment.
B. The Nature of the Remedy Sought Under Section 812
It is impossible to impose a clear distinction between the rights
an aggrieved individual may pursue under a section 813 civil action
and the section 812 administrative remedy The same rights are
being adjudicated. The fact that Congress does not permit an
aggrieved party to pursue these rights separately is a strong indi-
cation that they are identical. An administrative action cannot
commence if the aggrieved party has already pursued a legal remedy
in the district or state court.6
Even in the posture of the administrative adjudication, it is
hard to see how the aggrieved party's rights have lost their "legal"
character. The relief fashioned by the administrative law judge is
designed to compensate the complainant for actual damages as well
as any other injunctive or equitable relief deemed appropriate by
the judge.63 Civil damages also may be imposed. 64 However, the
essential remedy, which must be granted when an aggrieved party
proves discrimination, consists of money damages. This remedy
supports the presumption that the cause of action is legal in nature
and protected by the seventh amendment. Recently, in Chauffeurs
Local No. 391 v. Terry,65 Justice Marshall noted "an action for
money damages was 'the traditional form of relief offered in the
courts of law."' Yet, it would be a mistake to believe that "any
61 Id. at 197.
42 U.S.C. § 3612(f).
42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3).
"Id.
- U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990).
Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, -U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 1334, 1348 (1990)
(quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196).
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award or monetary relief must necessarily be 'legal' relief." 67 Dam-
ages may have an equitable character where they are restitutionary
such as in an "action for disgorgement of improper profits."' '
Similarly "a monetary award 'incidental to or intertwined with
injunctive relief' may be equitable." ' 69 Clearly, a claim under sec-
tion 812 does not involve restitution. The respondent has not
wrongfully held money owed the aggrieved parties, nor are the
damages sought under section 812 merely incidental to injunctive
relief. In some cases where actual damages are awarded, injunctive
relief may not be sought or granted. In any event, "[t]he right
cannot be abridged by characterizing the legal claim as 'incidental'
to the equitable relief sought." 70 This follows logically from the
Supreme Court holdings in Beacon Theaters, Inc. v Westover,71
and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood. 2 Both cases stand for the prop-
osition that "if . . [a] legal claim is joined with an equitable
claim, the right to jury trial on the legal claim . remains in-
tact." 73
Additionally, after the Tull decision, it appears that all civil
penalties are open to seventh amendment constitutional challenges.
The Tull Court held that a violator of the Clean Water Act74 was
entitled to a jury trial on the issue of civil penalties:
A~civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could
only be enforced m courts of law Remedies intended to pumsh
culpable individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to
extract compensation or restore the status quo, were issued by
courts of law, not courts of equity. [The Clean Water Act]
does not direct that the "civil penalty" imposed be calculated
solely on the basis of equitable determinations, such as the profits
gamed from violations of the statute, but simply imposes a max-
imum penalty of $10,000 per day of violation.75
Nor does the Fair Housing Act under section 812 direct that
civil penalties be imposed on the basis of equitable determinations.
The language of the act merely limits the maximum amount that
Id. (quoting Curtis, 430 U.S. at 196).
" Id. (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 424).
6 Id.
70 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 n.l'.
71 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
- 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
" Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 n.11.
7 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
71 Tull, 481 U.S. at 422.
1990-91]
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an administrative law judge may levy based on the existence of
prior violations by the respondent. 76 Basing the civil penalty on
prior bad behavior strongly suggests that the remedy is designed
to punish culpable individuals and should come under the rule of
Tull, which requires a jury trial. For the most part Congress chose
to ignore objections concerning constitutional challenges to the
section 812 civil penalties. Congress believed it had the power to
assign this newly created cause of action to a non-article III tri-
bunal.Y
Considering the history and the nature of the right provided in
section 812, it appears a party is entitled to a jury trial under the
seventh amendment. The remaimng step in the Granfinanclera,
S.A. v. Nordberg78 analysis is to determine "whether Congress may
[assign] resolution of the relevant claim to a non-Article III adju-
dicative body.. -79
IV ARTICLE III CHALLENGES TO SECTION 812
In Northern Pipeline Constr Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co.,80
the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the jurisprudence surround-
ing article III constitutional challenges. The result was a complex
plurality opinion that allows Congress to assign a cause of action
to a non-article III court only if the cause falls under one of three
exceptions. Noting the "frequently arcane distinctions and confus-
ing precedents" 8 surrounding the constitutional law of article III
courts, Justice Rehnquist warned in his concurring opinion,
-' 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3)(A)-(C) provides civil penalties for first offenders of up to
$10,000. Repeat offenders who have committed a violation within the last five years may
be fined up to $25,000. Offenders with two or more violations within seven years can
receive a civil penalty 6f up to $50,000.
77 H.R. Rm,. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 74-75 (1988). Dissenters to the civil
penalties clearly pointed out the faulty analysis of the congressional majority. The right
being compensated under section 812 "is personal to the person injured" due to the very
nature of the definition of "aggrieved person" under section 802(i), 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i):
"Aggrieved person" includes any person who-
(1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or
(2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing
practice that is about to occur.
Consequently, as will be developed in the following section, a private right of action cannot
be assigned to a non-article III court.
78 _ U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989); see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, -. U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2790 (1984).
- 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
11 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91 (1982).
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The cases dealing with the authority of Congress to create courts
other than by the use of its power under Art. III do not admit
of easy synthesis. I need not decide whether these cases in
fact support a general proposition and three tidy exceptions, as
the plurality believes, or whether instead they are but landmarks
on a judicial "darkling plain" where ignorant armies have clashed
by night.82
Accepting these limitations, Northern Pipeline presents an ex-
cellent analytical framework for probing article III challenges.
Northern Pipeline found the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197883 to
be unconstitutional. Congress had assigned all matters related to a
bankruptcy petition to non-article III bankruptcy courts. The
Northern Pipeline Company attempted to bring a contract claim
before the court, but Marathon Pipe Line Company successfully
contended that the Bankruptcy Reform Act unconstitutionally con-
ferred article III judicial power upon judges who lack life tenure
and protection against salary dimnution. 4 The Supreme Court in
its plurality opimon held that Congress remained limited in what
matters it could assign to non-article III or so-called "legislative
courts." Past precedents when properly understood indicated,
[There is] no broad departure from the constitutional com-
mand that the judicial power of the United States must be vested
in Art. III courts. Rather, they reduce to three narrow situations
not subject to that command, each recognizing a circumstance in
which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive Branches
was hustorically and constitutionally so exceptional that the con-
gressional assertion of a power to create legislative courts was
consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional
mandate of separation of powers.'-
"Territorial courts" are the first of three narrow exceptions in
which Congress may assign causes of action to a non-article III
court. "[T]he Framers intended that as to certain geographical
areas, in which no State operated as sovereign, Congress was to
exercise the general powers of government. 8 6
82 Id. at 91.
Pub.L. 95-958, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
"Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60. Life tenure and protection against salary dinu-
nution are the two aspects defimng an article III judge, and therefore an article III court.
See supra note 45 for further discussion of this point.




The second exception "involves a constitutional grant of power
that has been historically understood as giving the political Branches
of Government extraordinary control over the precise subject mat-
ter at issue." For example, military courts fit this definition, as
article I, section 8, cl. 13, 14 gives Congress the power "[tio
provide and maintain a Navy," and "[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
The final exception involves courts created by Congress to
adjudicate cases involving "public rights." This notion was first
advanced in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
CO. :88
[W]e do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a
suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the
other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which,
from its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination. At
the same time there are matters, involving public rights, which
may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable
of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial deter-
mination, but which congress may or may not bring within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem
proper.89
Clearly, the administrative tribunal under section 812 is not a
"territorial court" or a legislative court derived from specific au-
thority in article I of the Constitution. Consequently, only the final
exception may apply. If section 812 is to survive an article III
challenge, one must show that Congress created a new "public
right" of action.
A. "Public Right" Versus Private Right Nature of Section 812
Article III, section 2 provides in part, "The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
which shall be made. . . ."9 Although originally suggested by the
language of Murray's Lessee,9 1 in Atlas Roofing Co. v Occupa-
17 Id. at 67.
- 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
91 59 U.S. 272.
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tional Safety Comm'n9 the Supreme Court explicitly stated the
standard by which the Court would assess article III challenges.
Atlas involved a challenge to the new statutory duties imposed
upon employers by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
of 1970.91 The petitioner argued that it had been deprived of its
seventh amendment right to trial by jury. Petitioner contended that
the penalties assessed by the Secretary of Labor under OSHA were
strongly analogous to tort claims. The Court rejected petitioner's
argument by saying a new "public right" had been created by
Congress. Congress had concluded that traditional remedies in
courts of law could not cope with the rising number of work-
related deaths. Since traditional tort claims were inadequate to
protect workers, a new "public right" to safe working conditions
was created.Y "[Wihen Congress creates new statutory 'public
rights,' it may assign their adjudication to an admnistrative agency
with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating
the Seventh Amendment's injunction that a jury trial is to be
'preserved' in 'suits at common law."' 95
The Atlas standard focuses on characterizing rights as either
"public rights" or "private nghts."9'
[I]n cases in which "public nghts" are being litigated-e.g., cases
in which the Government sues m its sovereign capacity to enforce
public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to
enact-the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from
assigning the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an
administrative forum with wich the jury would be incompati-
ble.9
The Court reaffirmed this principle in Granfinancera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, quoting the Atlas Roofing decision:
In Atlas Roofing, we noted that "when Congress creates new
statutory 'public rights,' it may assign their adjudication to an
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
91 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (West 1988).
" Atlas Roofing Co. & Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 444-45 (1977).
" Id. at 455.
9 This new "public rights"/"pnrvate rights" doctnne seems to have been created to
decide the Atlas Roofing case. Although suggested in the dicta of Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S.
272, it is not the explicit holding of any earlier opinions, and scholars have been critical of
its creation by Justice White. At least one finds no historical basis for this new construct.
See, e.g., Kirst, Admimstrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court's Assault
on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv 1281, 1293-1338 (1978).
- Atlas, 430 U.S. at 450.
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adminstrative agency with which a jury trial would be incom-
patible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction
that jury trial is to be 'preserved' in 'suits at common law ' We
emphasized, however, that Congress' power to block application
of the Seventh Amendment to a cause of action has limits.98
One of those "limits" is reached when the creation of new
"public rights" supplants previously established "private right"
actions.
Congress may devise novel causes of action involving public rights
free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment if it assigns
their adjudication to tribunals without statutory authority to em-
ploy juries as factfinders. But it lacks the power to strip parties
contesting matters of private right of their constitutional right to
a trial by jury [T]o hold otherwise would be to permit
Congress to eviscerate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee by
assigning to administrative agencies or courts of equity all causes
of action not grounded in state law, whether they originate in a
newly fashioned regulatory scheme or possess a long line of
common-law forebears."
Indeed, some of the earliest case law regarding article III ju-
risdiction appears to support the proposition that Congress may
not "withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from
its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity,
or admiralty ",10o
What then is the nature of the right under section 812? Is it a
"public right" or a "private right" 9 And how can one decide?
The Court attempted more accurately to define this difference in
Crowell v Benson.101 "Private rights" cases involve the "liability
of one individual to another under the law as defined," 1°2 as
opposed to "public rights" cases that "arise between the Govern-
ment and persons subject to its authority in connection with the
performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or
legislative departments. "103 Such "public rights" could be assigned
to non-article III legislative courts for adjudication.
" Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2795 (quoting Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 455).
" Id.
1w Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284.
101 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
"1 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
I Id. at 50.
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Congress, m exercising the powers confided to it, may estab-
lish "legislative" courts (as distinguished from "constitutional
courts in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution
can be deposited") which are to serve as special tribunals
"to examine and determine various matters, arising between the
government and others, which from their nature do not require
judicial determination and yet are susceptible to it." But, "the
mode of determining matters of this class is completely within
the congressional control. Congress may reserve itself the power
to decide, may delegate the power to the executive officer, or
may commit it to judicial tribunals." Familiar illustrations of
admunistrative agencies created for the determination of such
matters are found in connection with the exercises of the con-
gressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation,
immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the
post office, pension and payments to veterans."04
Critics of the administrative adjudication provisions argue that
the right of action provided under section 812 is "private in nature,
in that it is intended to determine the liability of one individual to
another."'0 5 The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
noted in a memo opposing the enactment of section 812, "only
private litigants may initiate the admmstrative proceeding," and
in fact, "virtually the only role played by the Government is to
provide a federal rule of decision which defines the liability between
private actors."'' t Thus, under section 812 HUD's role is largely
geared "to vindicating the rights of the private litigant."'10
More generally, the right created here is essentially a civil right
and civil rights statutes are "intended to create personal rights,
guaranteed to the mdividual."0 8
114 Id. at 50-51 (quoting Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 .(1929)).
-' Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1158 Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Law, 99th Cong., ist Sess. ._ (1987) (Charles J.
Cooper, Asst. Atty. Gen., "Use of Punitive Damages in the Fair Housing Act" Memo
Prepared for Asst. Atty. Gen. Reynolds, June 8, 1987) at p. 741. At these hearings, the
Reagan Administration, through Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds,
argued vigorously for scrapping the administrative adjudication scheme now in section 812
for one in which arbitration would be used.
106 Id.
107 Id.
Im Id., see generally Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 446 (1982); University of Cal.
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (opinon of Powell, J.); Los Angeles Dept. of




ITihe statutorily created right here derives from a dignitary tort
and is enforceable primarily by private individuals for their own
benefit pursuant to. common law remedies, the Court's precedents
strongly indicate that these adnuistrative hearings will be viewed
as "wholly private tort cases [that] are not at all implicated"
by the public right exception described in Atlas Roofing.1°9
The Supreme Court used similar language in Curtis v. Loether"
An action to redress racial discrimination may also be likened to
an action for defamation or intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress. Indeed, the contours of the latter tort are still developing,
and it has been suggested that "under the logic of the common
law development of a law of insult and indignity, racial discrim-
ination might be treated as a dignitary tort."' 10
In section 812, Congress has attempted to place the trial of a
wholly "private right" beyond the view of an article III court.
Yet, it is possible for Congress to supersede "private rights" of
action by creating new categories of "public rights."
B. New "Public Rights" Superseding Previously "'Private
Rights"
Clearly, Congress can create novel "public rights" that closely
parallel traditional "private rights." "Congress may fashion causes
of action that are closely analogous to common-law claims and
place them beyond the ambit of the Seventh Amendment by as-
signing their resolution to a forum in which jury trials are una-
vailable." 1 ' Possibly, in amending section 812, Congress created a
new "public right," and the individual damages to be awarded
aggrieved parties in the administrative forum are merely incidental
to the enforcement of this new "public right" to fair housing. The
Office of Legal Counsel recognized this and stated,
inhere are clearly precedents for administrative bodies both en-
forcing public policy and providing incidental relief, including
monetary relief, to private citizens. As courts have recently noted
in the context of administratively determined reparations awards
under the Commodity Exchange Act, the fact that new statutory
,01 Id. (quoting Atlas Roofing, supra, 430 U.S. 458).
11 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.10 (1974) (quoting C. GREGORY & H.
KALvEN, CAsES AND MATER Ams ON ToRTS 961 (2d ed. 1969)).
"I Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2796 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Block
v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921); Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856).
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rights are enforceable in favor of a private party does not preclude
adnumstrative adjudication of such rights. 112
The mere fact that damages are awarded to private parties does
not ipso facto mean that it is a private right. Such a conclusion
would effectively eviscerate the administrative proceedings for many
of the nation's administrative agencies. In an attempt to bolster
arguments for the constitutionality of section 812, Professor Arthur
Wolf noted the great number of federal agencies that routinely
assess damages in favor of injured individuals:
Many agencies have authority to award remedial damages.
For example, the Interstate Commerce Comnussion, the Federal
Maritime Cominnssion, and the Commodity Futures Trading
Comnussion have the power to hear claims of persons whose
rights have been violated under the applicable statutes and to
award damages or reparations for such violations. Furthermore,
the Secretary of Agriculture, under the Packers and Stockyard
Act and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, has the
authority to entertain and resolve individual claims and to award
damages to injured complainants. Finally, the Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs in the Department of Labor processes
claims of coal miners and maritime workers for employment
related injuries or deaths. In each of these instances, the initial
hearing is before an adnumstrative law judge who may enter an
order awarding damages to the complaimng party In each case,
the person found to have violated the law is required to satisfy
the damage award." 3
In this situation, Congress has not created a new or novel right
of action. Instead, it has merely tacked-on an administrative forum,
allowing HUD to
enter the fray, not at the outset, but nearly [23] years after the
creation of a private cause of action in the district court which
provides for identical remedies, and nearly [17] years after the
Supreme Court expressly ruled that under such circumstances trial
by jury must be available on demand. 1 4
112 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1158 Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Law, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) (Ralph W Tarr,
Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., "Re: Whether a Jury Trial is Required in Enforcement Proceedings
Under S. 1220" memo proposed for Asst. Atty. Gen. William Bradford Reynolds, February
8, 1987) at p. 255.
113 Id. at 73 (statement of Arthur D. Wolf, Western New England College School of
Law).
114 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16, 20 '1978).
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However, even when it appears that a "private right" of action is
involved, the Supreme Court has been willing to concede that
Congress can assert a superior "public right," particularly where
the government is a party*
In Atlas Roofing, we noted that Congress may effectively sup-
plant a common-law cause of action carrying with it a right to a
jury trial with a statutory cause of action shorn of a jury trial
right if that statutory cause of action inheres in or lies against
the Federal Government in its sovereign capacity Our case law
makes plain, however, that the class of "public rights" whose
adjudication Congress may assign to admimstrative agencies or
courts of equity sitting without juries is more expansive than
Atlas Roofing's discussion suggests. Indeed, our decisions point
to the conclusion that, if a statutory cause of action is legal in
nature, the question whether the Seventh Amendment permits
Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal that does not
employ juries as factfinders requires the same answer as the
question whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudica-
tion of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal. For if
a statutory cause of action is not a "public right" for Article
III purposes, the Congress may not assign its adjudication to a
specialized non-Article III court 15
Has Congress supplanted the "private right" found in Curtis,
and maintained under section 813, by establishing under section
812 a new "public right" protecting against discrimination in hous-
ing? Is this new right similar to the safe workplace "public right"
created under OSHA? It would seem not.
The "private right" of action survives under the new section
812. Aggrieved parties need only enter district court to press that
"private right.' ' 16 The existence of another forum should not affect
the nature or character of that right absent something more. There
is no reason to assume that because HUD intervenes in a case
through the mechanism of an adrmistrative hearing a "public
right" has magically been created. In the administrative hearing,
the government is in substance deciding one individual's private
rights versus those of another. The dispute has only the formal
"I Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2796.
116 See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
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appearance of a dispute between an individual and the Govern-
ment.11
7
The nature of the proceeding under section 812 is an action
for damages and injunctive relief between someone who claims his
or her "private rights" (rights that could have been litigated under
section 813) have been violated by someone else who allegedly
intends to commit or has committed housing discrimnation." 8
Creation of a new "public right" that assures a nation is free from
housing discrimination may well be within Congress's power, but
no such "public right" appears to have been created. Since Curtis,
the rights at issue have been viewed as "private rights."'119 An
individual's right to recover damages under section 812 is based
on the violation of what is essentially a personal civil right and a
dignitary tort. The cause of action brought before the adnmstra-
tive law judge is not the vindication of newly created statutory
duties owed the federal government by the violator, as was the
case in Atlas.1 2 Rather, the right adjudicated under section 812 is
basically the same as the private civil action permitted under section
813. This right is "one of private right, that is, of liability of one
individual to another under the law as defined."' 21
C. Creation of an Extensive Regulatory Scheme Supplanting
"Private Rights"
A more convincing case that a "public right" is at work in
section 812 could be made if Congress had created an extensive
regulatory scheme and inclusion of ancillary "private rights" was
essential to the proper functiomng of the scheme. In Thomas v
Union Carbide Agric. Products Co.,'2 the Court held that the
binding arbitration scheme under the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
117 Professor Laurence Tribe has criticized the "form over substance" analysis, which
assumes that, because the government is in some way superficially involved, the action
necessarily implicates "public rights." He notes that "Congress could avoid conferring
jurisdiction upon an Article III court simply by altering the party structure in its new action,
by replacing the private plaintiff with a government prosecutor." L. TRmE, AmER CAN
CONsTrITUoNAL LAw 53 (2d ed. 1988).
Is See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(g)(3) (West Supp. 1990) (Administrative law judges' order
for relief "may include actual damages suffered by the aggrieved person and injunctive or
other equitable relief.").
"I See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
"2 See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
121 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.
1 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
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cide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)12 did not violate article III.
Rejecting an analytical approach that would favor form over sub-
stance, the Court instead looked to the substance of the arbitration
provision and concluded it was a "pragmatic solution to the dif-
ficult problem of spreading the costs of generating adequate infor-
mation regarding the safety, health, and environmental impact of
a potentially dangerous product."'' 2 Justice O'Connor concluded,
Given the nature of the right at issue and the concerns motivating
the Legislature, we do not tink this system threatens the inde-
pendent role of the Judiciary in our constitutional scheme. "To
hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the
legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpen-
sive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which
are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an
administrative agency specially assigned to that task."''
Using the analytical framework of Thomas, in Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v Schor2 the Court found the regula-
tory scheme under the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA),127 wich
allowed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to
adjudicate state counterclaims, passed article III scrutiny-
"[L]ooking beyond form to the substance of what" Congress has
done, we are persuaded that the congressional authorization of
limited CFTC jurisdiction over a narrow class of common law
claims as an incident to the CFTC's primary, and unchallenged,
adjudicative function does not create a substantial threat to the
separation of powers.'2
Addressing article III concerns more directly, the Court found,
When Congress authorized the CFTC to adjudicate counter-
claims, its primary focus was on making effective a specific and
limited federal regulatory scheme, not on allocating jurisdiction
among federal tribunals. Congress intended to create an mexpen-
sive and expeditious alternative forum through winch customers
could enforce the provisions of the CEA against professional
3 7 U.S.C. 136 §§ et seq. (West 1988).
11 Thomas v. Umon Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590 (1985).
,12 Id. (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46).
1- 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
127 7 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (West 1988).
128 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854 (1986) (quoting
Union Carbide, 475 U.S. at 589).
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brokers. Its decision to endow the CFTC with jurisdiction over
such reparations claims is readily understandable given the per-
ception that the CFTC was relatively immune from political pres-
sures . and the obvious expertise that the Commission possesses
m applying the CEA and its own regulations. This reparations
scheme itself is of unquestioned constitutional validity £29
Additionally, earlier case law indicates Congress could assign
an action to a non-article III forum if a jury trial would "go far
to dismantle the statutory scheme.'"'13
Looking to the substance of the administrative tribunal pro-
vided under section 812, it is apparent that the administrative
tribunal is not a part of a regulatory framework in which "private
rights" are merely incidental. The purposes of the Fair Housing
Act are diverse. It exists to vindicate individual rights as well as
promote a general national policy against housing discrimination.
Under section 814, the Attorney General is given authority to
enforce the act whenever there is reasonable cause to suspect a
violation. 31 Yet, the focus of sections 812 and 813 is to encourage
individuals to seek individual damages as compensation for the
discriminatory conduct.132 For instance, under the amended section
812, aggrieved parties are to bring those "private rights" actions
before an administrative tribunal.1 33
Unlike OSHA, FIFRA, or the CFTC, the Fair Housing Act
sets forth no complex set of administrative rules to be administered
and interpreted as part of a general regulatory scheme. There is
no extensive federal regulation of the housing industry, as there is
with work sites, hazardous chemicals, and commodity futures trad-
mg. With respect to housing discrimination, the personal right of
action against a violator remains the major vehicle for enforcement
of the Fair Housing Act, as it has since that personal right was
created by the 1968 enactment of old section 812. It is highly
unlikely that, in passing the 1988 amendments, Congress believed
a jury would be incompatible with the determination of the rights
accorded under new section 812, primarily because Congress has
retained the right to a jury trial for any party who wishes it.134
1 Id. at 855-856 (citations omitted).
,10 Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S."It 454 n.ii.
" See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
&2 See supra notes 16-44 and accompanying text.
3 See supra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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Any attempt to assert the rights adjudicated under the new
section 812 are in fact "public rights" seems doomed to failure.
These rights already have been characterized by the Court in Curtis
as "private rights," similar to common law torts.'35 An assumption
that rights analogous to "public rights" are created merely by the
private parties agreeing to submit to an administrative tribunal
would place form over substance and strain the substantive dis-
tinction between "public" and "private rights." Congress has not
created a new regulatory scheme based on its article I power.
Instead it has attempted to substitute an administrative tribunal
for an article III court. The justification that such tribunals are
speedier and less costly hardly seems a sufficient reason for disre-
garding the Constitution. Administrative hearings will always be
quicker and cheaper than court trials; extension of this justification
would completely gut the protections of article III, effectively
denying seventh amendment protection to individuals being tried
on their legal liability to other individuals.
Despite these Constitutional infirmities, recent case law might
permit the use of an administrative tribunal to resolve disputes
when the parties enter such an adjudication voluntarily
V. WAIvER OF ARTICLE III & Tm SEvENTH AMENDMENT
In Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,3 6 the Court
attached great significance to whether or not the party asserting a
constitutional deprivation voluntarily participated in the non-article
III proceeding. The complaimng party in Schor opted for the
CFTC's administrative forum, rather than state or federal courts,
with full knowledge that the regulatory scheme allowed the CFTC
to hear all counterclaims, including state law counterclaims. The
Court concluded that "Schor indisputably waived any right he may
have possessed to the full trial of Conti's counterclaim before an
Article III court."' 3 7
This notion of voluntary waiver is present in an earlier decision,
Thomas v Union Carbide Agric. Products Co.138 In Thomas, the
Court implied that chemical companies subject to an arbitration
" See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
'7 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 849 (1986).
1- 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
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scheme under FIFRA were voluntary participants.1 39 However, the
only voluntary element appears to have been that the companies
were manufacturing chemicals in interstate commerce. In any event,
Schor stands for the proposition that, "as a personal right, Article
III's guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudica-
tion is subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional
rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal mat-
ters must be tried." 140 Additionally, such waiver need not be ex-
press. "Even were there no evidence of an express waiver here,
Schor's election to forgo his right to proceed m state or federal
court on his claim and his decision to seek relief instead in a CFTC
reparations proceeding constituted an effective waiver."1 41
While allowing the private protections of article III to be waived,
the Court in Schor concluded that the separation of powers inm-
tations imposed by article III could not be waived.1 42 Still, it found
that the CFTC admminstrative mechanism presented no threat to
the power of the judiciary-
It is clear that Congress has not attempted to "withdraw from
judicial cognizance" the determination of Conti's right to the
sum represented by the debit balance in Schor's account. Congress
gave the CFTC the authority to adjudicate such matters, but the
decision to invoke this forum is left entirely to the parties and
the power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction of these
matters is unaffected. In such circumstances, separation of powers
concerns are dirmmshed, for it seems self-evident that just as
Congress may encourage parties to settle a dispute out of court
or resort to arbitration without impermissible incursions on the
separation of powers, Congress may make available a quasi-
judicial mechanism through which willing parties may, at their
option, elect to resolve their differences. This is not to say, of
course, that if Congress created a phalanx of non-Article III
tribunals equipped to handle the entire business of the Article III
courts without any Article III supervision or control and without
evidence of valid and specific legislative necessitiesi the fact that
the parties had the election to proceed in their forum of choice
19 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agnc. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 591 (1985) ("The
danger of Congress or the Executive encroaching on the Article III judicial powers is at a
rmnmum when no unwilling defendant is subjected to judicial enforcement power as a
result of the agency 'adjudication."') (emphasis added).
11 Schor, 478 U.S. at 848-49.
4 Id. at 849.
142 Id. at 850-51.
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL
would necessarily save the scheme from constitutional attack. 43
This endorsement of article III waiver is perhaps more limited
than one might conclude from the above paragraph. The Court
permitted this waiver m the context of a regulatory scheme that
granted limited jurisdiction over state counterclaims in a situation
where not to do so would have made the scheme ineffective. 144
This makes it unclear whether or not Schor could be applied to
the administrative proceeding in section 812, where no regulatory
scheme appears to be present, but only the naked "private right"
provided by the Fair Housing Act.145
Since Thomas and Schor, several lower courts have considered
the question of consent to jurisdiction. One bankruptcy court has
concluded "there is no inherent constitutional limitation on the
ability of a bankruptcy court to adjudicate private claims' so long
as the parties consent to such adjudication."' 14 Another bankruptcy
court found that such consent does not offend article III separation
of powers concerns in a bankruptcy context because "[i]n the case
of Bankruptcy Judges, interference by a collateral branch is not a
genuine threat."' 47 This is because each bankruptcy judge is ap-
pointed by the court of appeals for its respective circuit. 4 The
newly created section 812 is more of an intrusion into the judiciary
The adnuistrative law judges are not under such direct control of
the courts of appeals.
Additionally, the intrusion into the judicial branch's preroga-
tive in Schor was extremely limited:
The Court in Schor allowed what perhaps had been thought to
be exclusively Article III cases to be tried in the first instance
before the admimstrative agency at the option of both parties.
The judiciary, however, did not thereby give up any real power
or prerogative; CFTC orders may only be enforced by a federal
district court, where they are subject to a non-deferential standard
of review (which is another way of describing supervision). That
is why the Court thought the magnitude of any intrusion of the
Judicial Branch "de minimis.' 49
4 Id. at 854-55.
14 See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 8-44 and accompanying text.
', Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 95 Bankr. 782, 787 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1989).
147 Jennings v. Coblentz (In re Jennings), 83 Bankr. 752, 761 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1988).
14 Id., see also 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (West 1988).
141 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at
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The standard of review is only marginally greater for the de-
cisions of the admimstrative law judges under section 812. "The
appellate court would review the legal issues de novo and the usual
standard of 'substantial evidence' would govern review of the
factual determmations."'i5° Section 812 represents just one more
step limiting article III courts' control and supervision over admin-
istrative tribunals. Factual issues in cases under section 812 will
receive less scrutiny by an article III court that is one step removed
from the trial than they would if the same court conducted the
trial. This may constitute more than a mere de minimis intrusion
into the judicial branch.
Generally, the Supreme Court has concluded that if the essen-
tial constitutional role of the judiciary is to be maintained, article
III judges must exercise control over the interpretation, declaration,
and application of federal law.1 51 Under the Fair Housing Act's
scheme, article III judges do retain that control, but it is weakened
by confinement to the Circuit Court level.152
Initially, it may be difficult to see how the use of what is
essentially a voluntary adnumstrative adjudication subject to review
at the circuit court level threatens the separation of powers under
article III. As in Schor, it appears "the power of the federal
judiciary to take jurisdiction of these matters is unaffected." 153 The
parties are merely choosing between what Congress hopes will be
a more expeditious forum, under the provisions of section 812,
and a more traditional route of prosecuting actions under section
813 in federal district court. Assuming that section 812 is not an
invasion of the judicial power, offensive to separation of powers
concerns, it would seem that waiver of article III. is permissible in
tis context. Similarly, waiver of the seventh amendment right to
jury trial simply becomes a matter of invoking the appropriate
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure."5 As in the bankruptcy or CFTC
"5 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1158 Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Law, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1987) (statement of
Arthur Wolf, Western New England College of Law).
M' See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
76-82 (1982) (declaring 1978 Bankruptcy Act delegation of authority to bankruptcy judges
a violation of article III); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685 (1980) (upholding
the Magistrates Act over an article III challenge).
112 See supra note 44.
" Schor,'478 U.S. at 855.
114 Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand as required by this rule
and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by the party of
trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
context, it may be assumed that when the parties under section
812 decide not to elect a civil action, they are waiving their article
III and seventh amendment protections. In effect, the parties have
consented to the jurisdiction of the adminstrative law judge by
agreeing to bring the case before the specialized forum of section
812.
The problem with this approach is that the voluntary nature
of this waiver remains questionable, especially for respondents. If
a section 812 respondent elects to proceed in district court, he or
she is exposed to unlimited liability for punitive damages.'55 No
punitive damages may be awarded in the administrative heanng. 56
Additionally, if an election for civil trial is made, the respondent
will face a U.S. Attorney provided for the aggrieved party, "to
commence and maintain" the civil action. 157
By agreeing to the adnuistrative forum, the respondent's po-
tential liability is limited to actual damages suffered and civil
penalties, subject to various caps.' 58 In the modern litigious climate
of the United States, enormous jury verdicts for punitive damages
are not unprecedented.' 59 One celebrated libel award involving
Penthouse magazine reached $25 million in punitive damages
alone. 160 Because a Fair Housing Act violation resembles a dignitary
tort, angry junes, offended by a respondent's conduct, could also
levy huge sums. A prudent respondent might feel some compulsion
to remain in the administrative setting where liability is limited to
actual damages, costs, and civil penalties.
Additionally, the respondent who exercises his or her seventh
amendment right by electing out of the section 812 proceeding will
have to face an opposing U.S. Attorney 161 Granted,.mn the admin-
istrative setting of section 812, the respondent will face government
withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
FED. R. Crv. P 38(d).
42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
' 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(g)(3) (the administrative law judge is permitted to assess a civil
penalty "to vindicate the public interest," but- such penalty may not in any situation exceed
$50,000).
137 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(o).
,5 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(g).
' See, e.g., R. SMou., SUING Tm Pnss 6 (1986) ("The awards many juries are
willing to return [in libel suits brought against the press] indicate that the American public
is not shocked by the size of the judgments these plaintiffs are seeking.").
"6 Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) (judicial panel
overturned jury award on a 2-1 vote).
"I See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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lawyers from HUD. However, one must remember that the section
812 proceeding follows an attempt to reach a conciliation agree-
ment with HUD officials. 162 HUD already will have been sensitized
to the respondent's concerns and may be more willing to press for
a settlement anucable to both sides of the dispute. Justice Depart-
ment attorneys may not have any such concerns. They enter the
process with no institutional commitment to resolve differences
between the parties. The U.S. Attorney is cast in more of a
prosecutonal role. Indeed, there would seem to be more social
opprobrium attached to being haled into federal district court by
the Justice Department than appearing before an admimstrative
forum. Viewed in this light, the adnumistrative option seems less
onerous for the respondent.
This inequitable shifting of remedies is repugnant to article III
separation of powers concerns. If a respondent insists upon a court
trial, he or she is subject to unlimited liability and must face a
Justice Department attorney provided by the United States Gov-
ernment to litigate such cases. The respondent has no real choice
in the matter. Thus, it cannot realistically be said that the respon-
dent has voluntarily waived his article III rights.
Likewise, aggrieved complainants are encouraged initially to
submit to the administrative process. If a complainant does not go
through the sections 810-812 process, she will not automatically
acquire a U.S. Attorney to try the case on her behalf. 63 Deciding
to file a complaint in federal district court under section 813 does
not assure that the Attorney General will mtervene. 64 However,
once a charge has been filed under section 812, the aggrieved party
is permitted to elect for civil action'65 which will trigger the ap-
pointment of a U.S. Attorney on the aggrieved party's behalf. 66
It is a "win/win" situation for the aggrieved party, who may
remain in the admmstrative proceeding or acquire free represen-
tation in a civil proceeding.
Congress has constructed a system that effectively discourages
one class of litigants (the section 812 respondents) from seeking to
have their rights adjudicated before article III courts. Section 812
encourages virtually all potential defendants to undergo admims-
2 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
6 See supra notes 9-25 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
' 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(a).
42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(o)(1).
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trative adjudication or suffer some unpleasant consequences. Such
waiver is not truly voluntary. Congress should not be able to assign
a "private right" to a non-article III forum simply by suborning
the personal waiver of the parties involved. Voluntanness of the
waiver is important. In Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instrome-
dix, 67 Judge Kennedy, now a Supreme Court Associate Justice,
writing for the majority in a ninth circuit opinion, upheld the use
of a federal magistrate to decide a patent infringement action and
counterclaim. He ruled that the parties had waived their article III
rights by agreeing to submit their case to a magistrate. However,
Kennedy noted such a waiver must be truly voluntary when viewed
within the context of the actual remedies available to the litigants.
The purported waiver of the right to an Article III trial would
not be an acceptable ground for avoiding the constitutional ques-
tion if the alternative to the waiver were the imposition of senous
burdens and costs on the litigant. If it were shown that the choice
is between tnal to a magistrate or the endurance of delay or other
measurable hardships not clearly justified by the needs of judicial
adnnistration, we would be required to consider whether the
right to an Article III forum had been voluntarily relinquished. 168
Section 812 respondents are saddled with several heavy burdens
should they choose to pursue their constitutional right to a jury
trial and an article III judge. They may have to pay court costs
and the opposing party's attorney fees should they not prevail;169
additionally, they face the imposition of potentially high punitive
damages.1 70 They also must face a U.S. Attorney bent on prose-
cuting the law on behalf of the aggrieved party.' 7' Respondents
confront none of these disadvantages if they agree to the admin-
istrative forum. To claim that section 812 is a constitutional consent
to jurisdiction effectively undermines the meaning of voluntary
waiver. That the waiver under section 812 should be so flawed is
not surprising. Congress did not consider the need for a valid
consent to jurisdiction. Instead Congress believed they had created
a new "public right" that could be assigned to an administrative
forum. 7 2
1- 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
16 Pacemaker Diagnostic Climc v. Instromedix, 725 F.2d 537, 543 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
169 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c)(2).
" 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c)(1).
1 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.




Curtis v Loether'73 indicates that the right to be litigated under
section 812 is one protected by the seventh amendment. It is
essentially a statutorily created dignitary tort. Congress can assign
analogous actions to non-article III courts if a "public right" is to
be litigated. Individual damage claims incident to those "public
rights" also can be adjudicated by non-article III courts. However,
attempting to find a "public right" under the administrative ad-
judication of section 812 strains logic and credulity. Congress has
not created a new "public right." Rather, Congress has attempted
to establish another tribunal to hear the merits of the same "private
right" established 23 years ago by the Fair Housing Act, the same
"private right" affirmed by the Supreme Court 17 years ago in
Curtis, and the same "private right" preserved as a civil action in
section 813 of the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act.
It may be possible to waive the requirements of article III and
the seventh amendment. Yet, permitting such waiver is an injustice
to the principle of the separation of powers. Allowing this scheme
to stand would be an open invitation to Congress to construct a
"phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped to handle the entire
business of the Article III courts. . .,,14To assure "voluntary"
waiver, Congress needs only to establish sufficiently negative con-
sequences to deter parties from electing an article III court. Ulti-
mately, the administrative adjudication under section 812 is an
abridgment of the seventh amendment's guarantee of trial by jury,
an unconstitutional affront to the protection afforded litigants of
an independent article III judge, and an impernmssible invasion of
the judiciary's article III powers.
Craig Sloan*
-- 415 U.S. 189 (1974); see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
7 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
* The author wishes to acknowledge the help and direction of Robert G. Schweam,
Wendell Cherry Professor, Umversity of Kentucky College of Law.
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